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Abstract
Cloud computing can provide a flexible way to effectively share data among multiple users since
it can overcome the time and location constraints of computing resource usage. However, the users of
cloud computing are still reluctant to share sensitive data to a cloud server since the cloud server should
be treated as an untrusted entity. In order to support secure and efficient data sharing in cloud computing
environment, Wei et al. recently extended the concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) to support
key revocation and ciphertext update functionalities, and proposed a revocable-storage identity-based
encryption (RS-IBE) scheme. In this paper, we show that the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. does not
satisfy the correctness property of RS-IBE. In addition, we propose a method to modify the existing
RS-IBE scheme to be a correct and secure scheme.
Keywords: Cloud computing, Identity-based encryption, Revocable-storage, Ciphertext update.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing is a new paradigm of computing system that provides computing resources such as com-
puting power or data storage according to the need of users. The advantage of cloud computing is that
cloud service users can use their computing resources as a service with low cost at any time from anywhere
through the Internet. Many technology companies provide various types of cloud services. The main dif-
ference between traditional server computing and cloud computing is that a cloud service provider can no
longer be regarded as a trusted entity. In other words, the cloud service provider should be treated as a
honest-but-curious adversary.
A typical application of cloud computing is to securely share data among a large number of users. In
this system, the data confidentiality should be provided because the cloud service provider is no longer a
trusted entity. In addition, if a user’s credential is expired or the user’s private key is compromised, then
a proper revocation method should be provided to handle this user. Furthermore, even if a revoked user
tries to access past data stored in the cloud server through collusion attacks, the security of data should be
guaranteed. Therefore, a secure data sharing system in the cloud server should consider various security
issues described above.
Recently, a revocable-storage identity-based encryption (RS-IBE) scheme for secure data sharing in
cloud storage was proposed by Wei et al. [7]. The basic idea of this RS-IBE scheme is to modify an
identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to additionally supports the key revocation and ciphertext update
functionalities. In particularly, they used the IBE scheme of Waters for the underlying IBE scheme and the
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tree-based key revocation scheme of Boldyreva et al. [1] for key revocation. Additionally, they modified
their scheme to support efficient ciphertext update by following the idea of forward-secure cryptographic
systems.
In this paper, we show that there is a serious problem in the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. That is, if
a ciphertext generated at time T is updated to another ciphertext with time T + 1 by the ciphertext update
algorithm, then this updated ciphertext with time T +1 cannot be decrypted by using a decryption key with
time T + 1. The reason of this decryption failure problem is that the decryption algorithm uses a random
value which is different from the random value used to encrypt a message if a ciphertext is updated. A more
detailed explanation of this problem is given in the later part of this work. To remedy this problem, we
propose a method to modify the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. to be a secure scheme without the decryption
failure problem.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the definition and scheme of RS-IBE
proposed by Wei et al. In Section 3, we point out that there is a correctness problem in Wei et al.’s RS-IBE
scheme. In Section 4, we propose a method to solve this problem by. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 5.
2 Review of the RS-IBE Scheme
In this section, we review the definition of RS-IBE including the correctness property and describe the
RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al.
2.1 Revocable-Storage Identity-Based Encryption
Definition 2.1 (Revocable-Storage Identity-Based Encryption). A revocable-storage identity-based encryp-
tion (RS-IBE) scheme consists of eight algorithms Setup, GenKey, UpdateKey, DeriveDK, Encrypt,
UpdateCT, Decrypt, and Revoke, which are defined as follows:
Setup(1λ ,Nmax,Tmax). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1
λ , the maximum number
of users Nmax, and the total number of time periods Tmax. It outputs a master key MK and public
parameters PP.
GenKey(ID,MK,PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input an identity ID, the master key MK,
and the public parameters PP. It outputs a private key SKID.
UpdateKey(T,RL,MK,ST,PP). The key update algorithm takes as input update time T , a revocation list
RL, the master key MK, a state ST , and the public parameters PP. It outputs a key update KUT .
DeriveDK(SKID,KUT ,PP). The decryption key derivation algorithm takes as input a private key SKID, a
key update KUT , and the public parameters PP. It outputs a decryption key DKID,T .
Encrypt(ID,T,M,PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input an identity ID, time T , a message M, and
the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext CTID,T .
UpdateCT(CTID,T ,T
′,PP). The ciphertext update algorithm takes as a ciphertext CTID,T , update time T
′,
and the public parameters PP. It outputs an updated ciphertext CTID,T ′ .
Decrypt(CTID,T ′ ,DKID,T ,PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CTID,T ′ , a decryption
key DKID,T , and the public parameters PP. It outputs an encrypted message M or ⊥.
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Revoke(ID,T,RL,ST,PP). The revocation algorithm takes as input an identity ID, revoked time T , a
revocation list RL, and a state ST . It outputs an updated revocation list RL.
The correctness property of RS-IBE is defined as follows: For all MK,PP generated by Setup, any SKID
generated by GenKey(ID,MK,PP) for any ID, any KUT generated by UpdateKey(T,RL,MK,ST,PP) for
any T,RL, CTID,T ′ generated by Encrypt(ID,T
′,M,PP) for any ID,T ′,M, if ID is not revoked at time T in
RL, then it is required that DKID,T can be derived by DeriveKey(SKID,KUT ,PP) and
• If T ′ ≤ T , then Decrypt(CTID,T ′ ,DKID,T ,PP) = M.
• If T ′ > T , then Decrypt(CTID,T ′ ,DKID,T ,PP) =⊥.
Additionally, it is required that the ciphertext distribution of UpdateCT(CTID,T ,T
′,PP) is statistically equal
to that of Encrypt(ID,T ′,M,PP).
2.2 Wei et al.’s RS-IBE Construction
To provide key revocation functionality, the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. [7] follows the binary tree-based
broadcast encryption method proposed by Boldyreva et al. [1]. Let BT be a binary tree for handling key
revocation. A user is randomly assigned to a leaf node in this BT . At this time, the private key SKID of a
user with an identity ID is associated with the set of nodes defined by Path(xID) which is the set of path
nodes from the root node to the leaf node xID, and a key update KUT at time T is associated with the set of
covering nodes defined by KUNodes(BT ,RL,T ) which is the set of nodes that covers all non-revoked leaf
nodes at time T . If the leaf node (or the private key) of a user ID is not revoked at time T , then there is a
common node x satisfying x˜ = Path(xID)∩KUNodes(BT ,RL,T ). The decryption of a ciphertext at time T
can be possible by using the private key element and key update element corresponding to the node x˜. For
the detailed description of KUNodes(BT ,RL,T ), please refer the work of Boldyreva et al. [1].
To provide ciphertext update functionality, this RS-IBE scheme uses the binary tree idea of Canetti
et al. [2] used to build forward-secure encryption schemes. Note that the binary tree idea for time man-
agement was widely used in other RS-ABE schemes [3–6]. Let ET be a binary tree to handle time in
a ciphertext. In this case, each time is sequentially allocated to a leaf node in ET from left to right.
In this case, CTNodes(ET ,T ) is defined as RightSibling(Path(vT )) \ Path(Parent(vT ))∪ {vT} where
RightSibling(S) is a set of RightChild(Parent(v)) of any node v ∈ S [4, 6]. Note that Wei et al. wrongly
defined CTNodes(ET ,T ) = {v|Parent(v) ∈ Path(vT ) and v /∈ Path(vT )}∪{vT } because this (wrongly de-
fined) set can include the left child node of Path(vT ), which will allow access to the past time node. To sup-
port ciphertext update, a ciphertext is constructed to have ciphertext elements associated withCTNodes(ET ,T ).
The main property of CTNodes is that if T < T ′, a ciphertext with CTNodes(ET ,T ) can be updated to a ci-
phertext withCTNodes(ET ,T ′) because for any node v′ ∈CTNodes(ET ,T ′) there is a node v′′ that matches
to CTNodes(ET ,T )∩Path(v′) and the ciphertext component for v′′ can be delegated to be a ciphertext for
v′. For other properties of CTNodes, please refer the work of Sahai et al. [6].
The RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. is described as follows:
Setup(1λ ,Nmax,Tmax): Let λ be the security parameter, Nmax = 2
n be the maximum number of users, and
Tmax = 2
ℓ be the total number of time periods. It chooses a bilinear group (p,G,GT ,e) with a
prime order p. It selects random g,g2 ∈ G and α ∈ Z
∗
p, and sets g1 = g
α . It also chooses random
u0,u1, . . . ,un,h0,h1, . . . ,hℓ ∈G and defines Fu(ID) = u0 ∏
n
i=1 u
ID[i]
i , Fh(T ) = h0 ∏
ℓ
j=1 h
T [ j]
j where ID[i]
and T [i] are the ith bit of ID and T respectively. It sets a binary tree BT with Nmax number of leaf
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nodes and sets a revocation list RL = /0, a state ST =BT . It outputs a master key MK = gα2 , and public
parameters PP =
(
(p,G,GT ,e),g,g1,g2,{ui}
n
i=0,{hi}
ℓ
i=0
)
.
GenKey(ID,MK,ST,PP): It assigns ID to a leaf node xID ∈BT . For each node x∈ Path(xID), it performs:
1) It fetches gx,0 from the node x. If gx,0 is not defined before, then it chooses random gx,0 ∈ G and
stores the pair (gx,0,gx,1 = g2 ·g
−1
x,0) in the node x. 2) It chooses random rx,0 ∈ Z
∗
p and obtains SKID,x =(
Kx,0 = g
α
x,0Fu(ID)
rx,0 ,Kx,1 = g
rx,0
)
. Finally, it outputs a private key SKID =
(
{(x,SKID,x)}x∈Path(xID)
)
and an updated ST = BT .
UpdateKey(T,RL,MK,ST,PP): For each node x ∈ KUNodes(BT ,RL,T ), it performs: 1) It fetches gx,1
from the node x. If gx,1 is not defined, then it sets the value similar to the key generation algorithm. 2)
It chooses random rx,1 ∈ Z
∗
p and obtains KUT,x =
(
U0 = g
α
x,1Fh(T )
rx,1 ,U1 = g
rx,1
)
. Finally, it outputs a
key update KUT =
(
{(x,KUT,x)}x∈KUNodes(BT ,RL,T )
)
.
DeriveDK(SKID,KUT ,PP): It finds a common node x in both SKID and KUT . If it fails to find, then it
returns ⊥. Note that If ID was not revoked during the time period T , then there exist a node x ∈
Path(BT ,xID)∩KUNodes(BT ,RL,T ). For this node x, it retrieves SKID,x = (Kx,0,Kx,1) and KUT,x =
(Ux,0,Ux,1) from SKID and KUT respectively. It chooses random r0,r1 ∈ Z
∗
p and outputs a decryption
key DKID,T =
(
D1 = Kx,0 ·Ux,0 ·Fu(ID)
r0 ·Fh(T )
r1 ,D2 = Kx,1 ·g
r0 ,D3 =Ux,1 ·g
r1
)
.
Encrypt(ID,T,M,PP): Let ET be a binary tree for time periods and vT be a leaf node associated with T
in ET . It chooses random s ∈ Z∗p and computes C0 = e(g1,g2)
s ·M,C1 = g
−s,C2 = Fu(ID)
s. For each
node v ∈ CTNodes(ET ,T ), it performs: 1) It chooses random sv ∈ Z
∗
p and sets sv = s if v = vT . 2)
It calculates CTv =
(
Cv,0 =
(
h0 ∏
|bv|
j=1 h
bv[ j]
j
)sv ,Cv,|bv |+1 = h
sv
|bv|+1
, . . . ,Cv,ℓ = h
sv
ℓ
)
. Finally, it outputs a
ciphertext CTID,T =
(
ID,T,C0,C1,C2,{CTv}v∈CTNodes(ET ,T )
)
.
UpdateCT(CTID,T ,T
′,PP): Let vT ,vT ′ be leaf nodes in ET assigned to T,T
′, respectively. If T ′ < T ,
then it returns ⊥ to indicate that T ′ is invalid. It chooses random s′ ∈ Z∗p and computes C
′
0 = C0 ·
e(g1,g2)
s′ ,C′1 =C1 ·g
−s′ ,C′2 =C2 ·Fu(ID)
s′ . For each node v′ ∈ CTNodes(ET ,T ′), it performs: 1) It
find a node v ∈CTNodes(ET ,T ) such that bv is a prefix of bv′ . 2) It chooses random sv′ ∈ Z
∗
p and sets
sv′ = s
′ if v′ = vT ′ . 3) It calculates CTv′ =
(
Cv′,0 =Cv,0 ·∏
|bv′ |
j=|bv|+1
Cv, j ·
(
h0 ∏
|bv′ |
j=1 h
bv′ [ j]
j
)sv′ ,Cv′,|bv′ |+1 =
Cv,|bv′ |+1 ·h
sv′
|bv′ |+1
, . . . ,Cv′,|bv′ |+ℓ =Cv,ℓ ·h
sv′
ℓ
)
. Finally, it outputs an updated ciphertextCTID,T ′ =
(
ID,T ′,
C′0,C
′
1,C
′
2,{CTv′}v′∈CTNodes(ET ,T ′)
)
.
Decrypt(CTID,T ,DKID,T ′ ,PP): Let DKID,T ′ = (D1,D2,D3). If T
′ < T , then it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it up-
datesCTID,T to obtainsCTID,T ′ =(ID,T
′,C′0,C
′
1,C
′
2,{CTv′}v′∈CTNodes(ET ,T ′))whereCTv′ =(Cv′,0, . . . ,Cv′,ℓ)
by running UpdateCT(CTID,T ,T
′,PP). It outputs a message M by computingC′0 ·e(C
′
1,D1) ·e(C
′
2,D2) ·
e(CvT ′ ,0,D3) where vT ′ is a leaf node associated with T
′.
Revoke(ID,T,RL,ST ): It adds (ID,T ) to RL and returns the updated RL.
Wei et al. claimed that above RS-IBE scheme is correct and secure if the ℓ-BDHE assumption holds.
3 Analysis of the RS-IBE Scheme
In this section, we show that the above RS-IBE scheme is not correct since the decryption fails if the
ciphertext time T is less than the decryption key time T ′.
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Lemma 3.1. Let ET be a binary tree for time periods and vT ,vT ′ be leaf nodes associated with time T,T
′,
respectively. If T + 1 ≤ T ′, then there exists a node v˜ = CTNodes(ET ,T )∩Path(vT ′) but vT 6= v˜. That is,
vT , v˜ ∈ CTNodes(ET ,T ), v is an ancestor node of vT ′ , and vT 6= v˜.
Proof. By the main property of CTNodes, we have that for any node v′ ∈ CTNodes(ET ,T ′) there is a
common node v′′ such that v′′ = CTNodes(ET ,T )∩Path(ET ,v′) if T +1≤ T ′. Therefore, for both nodes
vT and vT ′ associated with time T and T
′, there exists a node v˜ = CTNodes(ET ,T )∩Path(ET ,vT ′ . Now,
Let’s show that the node vT and the node v˜ are different. In the given condition, T + 1≤ T
′ is established,
and each time is sequentially assigned to a leaf node in ET . Therefore, two nodes vT ,vT ′ are different nodes
since T 6= T ′ and they are assigned to leaf nodes. Since the node v˜ belongs to the path nodes Path(ET ,vT ′),
the node v˜ can never be a leaf node if v˜ 6= vT ′ . Therefore, v˜ 6= vT is established, since vT 6= vT ′ and vT is a
leaf node.
Theorem 3.2. Let CTID,T be a ciphertext associated with time T and DKID,T ′ be a decryption key associated
with time T ′. If T + 1 ≤ T ′, then the ciphertext CTID,T cannot be decrypted by using the decryption key
DKID,T ′ in the decryption algorithm.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we first analyze nodes in the binary tree ET which are associated with the
ciphertext elements used in the decryption algorithm and then analyze how the random exponents of these
ciphertext elements are constructed. After that, we argue that the decryption algorithm will fail due to the
random exponents of the ciphertext elements which are used for decryption.
The decryption algorithm takes an original ciphertext CTID,T and a decryption key DKID,T ′ as input.
Then, it performs the UpdateCT algorithm to derive an updated ciphertext CTID,T ′ since T < T
′ . Next,
it uses the updated ciphertext element CvT ′ ,0, which is related to a leaf node vT ′ associated with the time
T ′, for the decryption. Here, the UpdateCT algorithm finds the node v˜ which is an ancestor node of vT ′
and belongs to the set CTNodes(ET ,T ), and delegates the ciphertext element Cv˜,0 to obtain the ciphertext
element CvT ′ ,0. From the Lemma 3.1, we have that the node v˜ which belongs to CTNodes(ET ,T ) is not
equal to the node vT if T +1≤ T
′.
Now, we analyze random exponents in the original ciphertextCTID,T which are associated with the nodes
inCTNodes(ET ,T ). The encryption algorithm generates ciphertext elements for nodes inCTNodes(ET ,T ).
According to the encryption algorithm, for each node v ∈ CTNodes(ET ,T ), if v = vT , then the same ran-
dom exponent s which is used for message encryption is used to generate Cv,0. If v 6= vT , then a new random
exponent sv is selected to generate Cv,0. However, since v˜ 6= vT from the previous Lemma 3.1, the random
exponent sv˜ is not equal to s with high probability where sv˜ is used for the node v˜.
The decryption algorithm finally calculates the following equation by using the ciphertext elements and
decryption elements.
C′0 · e(C
′
1,D1) · e(C
′
2,D2) · e(CvT ′ ,0,D3)
= M · e(g1,g2)
s · e(g−s,gα2 Fu(ID)
r
0Fh(T )
r1) · e(Fu(ID)
s,gr0) · e(Fh(T )
sv˜ ,gr1)
= M · e(g−s,Fh(T )
r1) · e(Fh(T )
sv˜ ,gr1)
= M · e(Fh(T ),g)
(sv˜−s)r1 .
Note that we ignored the re-randomization process since it does not affect our analysis. In order to correctly
obtain the message contained in the ciphertext, it is required that (sv˜ − s) ≡ 0 mod p should be satisfied.
However, in the previous analysis, this relation cannot be satisfied because the ciphertext element associated
with the node v˜ of the original ciphertext uses a new random exponent sv˜. Thus, the decryption can be
successful if T = T ′, but the decryption always fails except with negligible probability if T +1≤ T ′.
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4 Modification to the RS-IBE Scheme
In the previous section, we have shown that the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. does not satisfy the correctness,
which is the minimum requirement that the cryptographic scheme must satisfy, due to the problem of random
exponents in the encryption algorithm. In this section, we propose a modification to the RS-IBE scheme of
Wei et al. to guarantee the correctness and the security.
A simple way to modify the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. [7] is to force the ciphertext elements associ-
ated with CTNodes(ET ,T ) to use the same random exponent s which is used to encrypt a message in the
ciphertext component C0. In this case, there is no problem such that the decryption algorithm fails when the
ciphertext is updated since sv = s for all nodes v. However, this simple modification does not lead to a secure
RS-IBE scheme. The reason is that if multiple nodes are provided with ciphertext elements {hsj} associated
with the same random s, it is possible for anyone to use these elements to modify the original ciphertext
element with current time to derive another ciphertext element with past time. This makes it possible for a
revoked user to modify the ciphertext with current time to obtain a ciphertext with past time to decrypt the
original ciphertext. Therefore, this simple method does not work.
A secure and efficient method to modify the RS-IBE scheme is to use a cryptographic scheme that
supports ciphertext update functionality. Lee et al. [3–5] introduced the concept of self-updatable encryption
and proposed secure SUE schemes that efficiently handle ciphertext updates. Thus, we can modify the RS-
IBE scheme of Wei et al. to use the SUE scheme for the ciphertext update components and key update
components. The secure SUE scheme proposed by Lee et al. supports correct decryption although it uses
different random exponents in ciphertext elements associated with CTNodes(ET ,T ). Additionally, this
modified RS-IBE scheme can reduce the number of ciphertext elements from O(log2Tmax) to O(logTmax)
because of the efficiency of the SUE scheme. We also note that the existing RS-ABE scheme can be easily
converted to an RS-IBE scheme by changing the attribute set of ABE to the identity of IBE.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we pointed out that the RS-IBE scheme of Wei et al. does not provide the correctness property.
The problem of the RS-IBE scheme was that when a ciphertext with time T is updated to a ciphertext with
time T + 1, this updated ciphertext cannot be decrypted by using a decryption key with time T + 1. The
main reason of this problem was that the random exponent of the ciphertext element associated with a tree
node corresponding to time T +1 was not the same as the random exponent used to encrypt a message in the
ciphertext. This decryption problem cannot be solved in a simple way, so we proposed a method to modify
the previous RS-IBE scheme to be a secure and efficient RS-IBE scheme using a self-updatable encryption
scheme.
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